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What Happened Afterwards? Change and Continuity 
in the Hungarian Elite between 1988 and 2009 
Luca Kristóf  
Abstract: »Was passierte danach? Kontinuität und Wandel der Ungarischen 
Elite zwischen 1988 und 2009«. This article examines social continuity and 
discontinuity in the Hungarian political, economic and cultural elites between 
1988 and 2009. In these two decades, four empirical surveys (five among the 
economic elite) have been carried out at the Institute for Political Science of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to explore the composition, recruitment, 
lifestyle, and attitudes of different elite groups. This large amount of data 
(4773 persons, in total) allows us to follow long term trends not yet analysed 
and distinguish between several types of social processes in the Hungarian 
elite. The analysis complements but also augments some of the main findings 
of the earlier literature on elite circulation and reproduction under post-
communism. 
Keywords: elites, transformation, Post-Communism, Hungary. 
 
Hungarian elite change in the post-communist transition period was studied 
extensively in the 1990s. Summarising the numerous empirical research find-
ings, Iván Szelényi and his colleagues differentiated between the circulation of 
the political elite and the reproduction of the economic elite (Szelényi and 
Szelényi 1995, Szelényi et al. 1995). John Higley and his co-authors, though 
admitting segmental differences, argued that Hungarian elite change as a whole 
could be considered a classical elite circulation in a comparative perspective 
(Dogan and Higley 1998, Higley and Lengyel 2000). However, empirical inter-
est in the subject has waned since the end of the 1990s, and the long(er) term 
consequences of elite change have remained by and large unexplored. I propose 
that it is time to revisit the findings of earlier studies and examine in a broader 
historical perspective whether the outcomes of elite change have proved to be 
stable and the processes identified have continued in the directions anticipated. 
Analysing several quantitative databases comprising two decades, I follow the 
most important trends up to the present. I differentiate between three types of 
social processes in the elite:  
- (i) Long term social continuity; 
- (ii) Discontinuity related to elite circulation during the system change; 
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- (iii) Long term social changes not related to elite circulation during the 
system change. 
I argue that elite segments differed not only in the extent of circulation during 
the system change but a long term divergence between them can also be ob-
served. The political elite changed little after the period of political transforma-
tion and was characterised up to 2009 by the ‘survival of system transformers’. 
By contrast, both the economic elite and the cultural elite underwent significant 
changes between 1993 and 2009. Thus, more recent data shed new light on the 
dynamics of post-communist elite change. I propose that some of the still rele-
vant statements of transformational studies should be augmented.  
Before embarking on the empirical analysis, I clarify the notion of elite con-
tinuity and review the main arguments about the post-communist transforma-
tion of the Hungarian elite. 
Elite Transformation in Hungary 
Gabriella Ilonszki (Ilonszki 2003) differentiates between four approaches to 
elite continuity. The first and most simple approach focuses on personal conti-
nuity. This approach is of particular importance in the time of great social and 
political transformations. The second approach deals with the level of social 
continuity. It examines similarities and differences in terms of socio-demo-
graphic characteristics between old and new elites, rather than explore the 
individual career paths of elite members. The third approach focuses on struc-
tural continuity, i.e. the inner structural changes of the elite. At the highest 
level of abstraction, the system theory approach deals with the connections 
between elite configurations and the nature of the political system. 
The problem of elite continuity was present in the analysis of the political 
transformation of 1989-90 from the very beginning. The main focus of inquiry 
was on the personal continuity of the political and economic elite. The seminal 
research question of the transition period was asked by Szelényi and Szelényi 
(Szelényi and Szelényi 1995) and had originated in Pareto’s classical work 
(Pareto 1963) on elite circulation: Was the circulation of the elites (broad per-
sonal changes) or the reproduction of the elites (personal continuity) more 
characteristic of the social transformation in East-European societies? 
Theories about personal elite continuity (e.g. ‘grand coalition’ by Hankiss 
1989; ‘political capitalism’ by Staniszkis 1991) generally postulated that the 
socialist nomenclature managed, with the help of power networks, to guard 
their positions or convert them to economic capital, and thus became the true 
winners of the transformation. Erzsébet Szalai’s concept of ‘capital conversion’ 
(Szalai 1999) linked the conservation of power and the management of eco-
nomic transformation to the group of technocrats. The conflict of this well-
educated and relatively young fraction of the nomenclature with the old bu-
reaucratic elite during the eighties became one of the main factors that gener-
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ated social changes. According to Szalai, this technocratic elite – ab ovo open 
to liberalism and market economy – became an extremely successful capital-
converter in the process of economic transformation due to its cultural capital. 
In 1993, a comparative international survey helped to test these hypotheses 
on elite continuity. Relying on data from six Eastern-European countries (Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Russia), researchers 
found that changes in the political elite could be described best as circulation, 
while changes in the economic elite were more aptly characterised as reproduc-
tion. The reproduction of the nomenclature elite in the political sphere was 
blocked by serious social barriers; the preservation of political power was an 
existing but not typical phenomenon (Szelényi et al. 1995, Eyal and Townsley 
1995, Böröcz and Róna-Tas 1995).  
What did these results mean in the Hungarian context? In Hungary, one 
third of the economic elite of 1993 had been in top economic positions already 
before the system change, while a further 50 per cent had held lower but still 
managerial positions. 30 per cent of the elite of 1988 remained economic lead-
ers by 1993, while 23 per cent of them experienced downward mobility and 46 
per cent retired. Signifying the greater circulation of the political elite, 78 per 
cent of the old nomenclature elite were downwardly mobile by 1993. The cul-
tural elite proved to be the segment least touched by the transformation period. 
Regarding the whole Hungarian elite, 20 per cent of the old nomenclature elite 
guarded their elite positions, and 33 per cent of the new elite had been mem-
bers of the communist nomenclature. Meanwhile, 56 per cent of the cultural 
elite of 1988 managed to stay in position by 1993. The main social characteris-
tics of the cultural elite, contrary to the other two elite segments, did not change 
much between 1988 and 1993. This suggested that new elite members coming 
from sub-elite positions simply filled the ‘open spaces’ (Szelényi et al. 1995). 
The international survey in 1993 compared Hungarian elite circulation to 
Polish and Russian data. Among these three countries, Hungary showed the 
greatest degree of elite circulation within all elite segments. The researchers 
argued that, though the selection of the Hungarian elite in the late communist 
period had been more meritocratic than in the other two countries, the new 
Hungarian political elite attributed greater symbolic importance to elite change 
and accelerated circulation by administrative means. As a consequence, calcu-
lations based on data as of 1993 overestimated elite circulation: a certain de-
gree of restoration took place in the Hungarian elite after the forced circulation 
initiated by the first democratic government (Szelényi et al. 1995). 
Later comparative analysis qualified the view that elite circulation was es-
pecially strong in Hungary. In a study on the Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslo-
vakian nomenclature elites, Jacek Wasilewski concluded that though the mem-
bers of the old elite in all three societies had been exiled from top political 
positions, roughly half of them still managed to maintain elite status – albeit 
not in the same position as in the communist era. If elderly nomenclature mem-
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bers who retired were excluded, two thirds of the old elite still held elite posi-
tions in 1993 (Wasilewski 1998). These results led to the framing of the new 
notion of replacement circulation (Higley and Lengyel 2000). 
Which groups within the communist elite managed to survive democratic 
transformation? A few years later, still using evidence from the international 
elite study of 1993, Iván Szelényi and his co-authors argued that cultural capi-
tal played a leading role in the transition period (Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley 
1998). Their main point was that cultural capital was the most important type 
of capital used to reach elite status, power and privilege in the post-communist 
transition period. In line with Szalai’s concept of ‘capital conversion’, they 
contended that political capital was secondary and worked only in conjunction 
with cultural capital – in the case of late communist technocracy. 
By the time of the millennium, all the important empirical research findings 
had been published about East-European elite circulation. Summarizing the 
results of earlier studies, John Higley and György Lengyel (Higley and Lengyel 
2000) categorised the Hungarian (and also the Polish and the Czechoslovakian) 
system change as a classic case of elite circulation according to the model of 
Higley and Pakulski (Higley and Pakulski 1999). The mode of circulation was 
gradual and peaceful, while its scope was wide and deep enough to filter out 
unfit elite members and allow new social groups to join the elite.1  
Although the scholarly interest in elite continuity decreased after the 1990s, 
positional elite surveys have been periodically repeated at the Hungarian Acad-
emy of Sciences. The sampling has been designed so as to sustain comparabil-
ity with the original survey in 19932 (Table 1).  
Table 1: Elite Surveys Between 1993 and 2009 (N) 
Studied elite group 1988* 1993 1997 2001 2009 
Political elite 523 124 - 142 407 
Economic elite 102 578 582 482 457 
Cultural elite 187 159 - 213 203 
*The elite of 1988 was interviewed in 1993, together with the elite of 1993 
                                                             
1  Higley and his co-authors also contributed to the system theory level approach of Eastern 
European elite continuity, describing the Hungarian system change as an adaptive elite set-
tlement (Higley et al. 1996). 
2  The sample of the political elite was taken from the ‘Handbook of Hungarian Public Life’ 
that registers members of the government, MPs, leading bureaucrats of ministries, mayors 
and leaders of the most important social organisations. The economic elite sample contains 
top managers from the Hoppenstedt-Bonnier firm register. The cultural elite sample in-
cludes members of the Academy of Sciences, university rectors, leaders of research insti-
tutes, leaders of publishing houses and the media. Detailed sampling methods are available 
from the author. 
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This study is the first attempt to compare these databases to one another.3 The 
data allow us track social continuity and discontinuity in the Hungarian elite 
between 1988 and 2009.  
Social Continuity in the Hungarian Elite Between  
1988 and 2009 
The basic demographic characteristics of the Hungarian elite are rather similar 
to the European average: the vast majority of them are highly educated, mid-
dle-aged males. However, it is striking that the proportion of women in the 
political elite has not increased significantly during the past two decades (see 
Table 2). In the meantime, the share of women in the economic and cultural 
elites, starting from a very low level in 1988, more than doubled by 2009. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of female elite members in all elite segments is 
still under 20 per cent. 
Table 2: Gender (percent) 
 1988 1993 2001 2009 
Political elite     
male 82.6 88.1 89.4 83.7 
female 17.4 11.9 10.6 16.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Economic elite     
male 94.1 93.4 91 85.6 
female 5.9 6.6 9 14.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Cultural elite     
male 95.2 93.7 85 83.3 
female 4.8 6.3 15 16.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
The mean age of elite members is shown in Table 3. It may be surprising that 
the elite of the late communist period was not significantly older than subse-
quent elite groups. However, it overlaps with the findings of György Lengyel 
(Lengyel 2003). Lengyel argued that the transformation of the nomenclature 
elite had already started in the 1980s: the fluctuation accelerated to a pace one 
and a half times faster than in the earlier communist period. The new elite 
members were of younger age and came from families with higher social 
status. In the 1990s, the mean age of the economic and cultural elite segments 
did not change considerably. During the whole period studied, cultural elite 
                                                             
3  For the analysis of 2001 data see Csurgó et al. 2001, Kovách 2002. Data of 2009: Kovách 
2011 (in Hungarian). 
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proved to be the oldest group with its constant mean age around 57-58 years. 
By 2009, a somewhat ageing political elite overtook the economic elite which 
is still slightly under 50 years.  
Table 3: Mean Age (year) 
 1988 1993 2001 2009 
Political elite 48.6 47.9 52.9 54.4 
Economic elite 52.2 48.1 49 49.8 
Cultural elite 57.8 57.9 56.6 58.2 
Table 4: Birth Cohorts (percent) 
Political elite 1988 1993 2001 2009 
-1929 15.7   5.2   6.3   2.1 
1930-39 33.1 21.6 12.0   3.6 
1940-49 35.2 39.2 36.6 26.6 
1950-59 13.6 27.8 32.4 38.8 
1960-69   2.5   6.2   7.7 18.3 
1970- 0 0   4.9 10.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Economic elite  1988 1993 2001 2009 
-1929 14.7   1.4 0.6 0 
1930-39 56.9 22.1   7.3   1.1 
1940-49 27.5 50.7 32.1 15.8 
1950-59   1.0 24.4 39.8 36.0 
1960-69 0   1.4 16.9 28.1 
1970- 0 0   3.3 19.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Cultural elite  1988 1993 2001 2009 
-1929 48.1 28.9 12.2   4.4 
1930-39 36.4 32.7            16   9.9 
1940-49 13.4 28.,9 36.2 30.5 
1950-59   2.1   8.8 26.3 33.3 
1960-69 0   0.6   7.5 16.2 
1970- 0 0   1.9   5.4 
Total  100 100 100 
 
If we take a look at the cohorts of the elite (Table 4), we can see that at the time 
of the first three surveys the cohort born between 1940 and 1949 was the most 
populous one in the political elite. The younger members of this cohort belong 
to the baby boomers, i.e. the cohort who epitomized the cultural change of the 
1960s. This cohort has been called ‘the great generation’ in Hungary, and, 
being in their forties at the time of the system change, they did their share in 
shaping the new Hungarian democracy. A generational change finally occurred 
between 2001 and 2009, when this cohort lost its leading part in favour of the 
next cohort born between 1950 and 1959. However, the ‘great generation’ still 
composed more than one fourth of the Hungarian political elite in 2009. In the 
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cultural elite, which is considerably older than the other the segments, members 
of the ‘great generation’ came into elite positions in the early nineties and still 
consisted the second largest cohort by 2009. In the economic elite, there seems 
to be no such distinguished generation; the shifts between cohorts have been 
more even and gradual. 
The education level of the Hungarian elite in the whole studied period has 
been very high (Table 5). The share of university or college graduates is above 
90 percent in the political elite.4 The political elite of 1988 was not an excep-
tion to this rule. Contrary to the communist ideology of (manual) workers’ 
domination, the share of graduates was extremely high. However, the elite of 
1993 with 97.9 per cent of graduates surpasses even the late communist politi-
cal elite. The first democratic parliament and government were often labelled 
as ‘amateur intellectuals’ in politics. Later, the share of graduates fell back to 
the earlier – still very high – level.  
In the late communist period, virtually all members of the economic and cul-
tural elites held university or college degrees. The per definitionem very high 
educational level of the cultural elite has not changed since, while the share of 
graduates in the economic elite decreased. This is probably the impact of eco-
nomic transformation: a group of self-made entrepreneurs gradually found their 
way into the capitalist elite (see Csite and Kovách 1999) 
Table 5: Education Level (per cent) 
Political elite 1988 1993 2001 2009 
University degree 91.25 97.9 80.3 74.6 
College degree   9.9 17.7 
Lower 8.8 2.1 9.8   7.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Economic elite 1988 1993 2001 2009 
University degree 99 93.1 62.4 64.1 
College degree   25.4 23.4 
Lower   1   6.9 12.2 12.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Cultural elite 1988 1993 2001 2009 
University degree 100 98.1 88.3 86.2 
College degree   10.3 11.8 
Lower 0   1.9   1.4 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
The binary variable of father’s occupation (manual/non-manual) offers a rough 
proxy for measuring the social composition of different elite segments. This 
                                                             
4  Another specific feature is the high share of elite members holding technical degrees (Ilon-
szki 2012). 
5  In the survey of 1993, the type of tertiary education was not specified. 
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variable suggests a closing of the Hungarian elite during the past two decades 
(Table 6). In the late communist period, the majority of fathers had manual jobs 
in all three segments of the elite. The economic elite was most open in terms of 
social mobility: more than 70 per cent of this elite group had fathers who had 
been manual workers. Obviously, the share of non-manual workers in the 
population decreases as we go back in time. Nevertheless, the huge difference 
between the composition of the elites in 1988 and 1993 is striking. After the 
political transformation, ideologically forced social mobility lost its effect. As a 
consequence, by 1993 the share of manual workers among the fathers of the 
political elite members fell by 24.6 per cent. The same tendency occurred in the 
economic elite (a decrease by 14.5 per cent) and the cultural elite (19.1 per 
cent). By the time of the millennium, the proportion of non-manual working 
fathers was above 60 per cent in all elite segments. Their share in the cultural 
elite – always the most closed in terms of origin – reached 70 per cent. This 
rather closed composition seems to be steady – the relative shares of fathers 
with manual and non-manual occupation did not change between 2001 and 
2009. 
Table 6: Father’s Occupation (when respondent was 14 year old) (per cent) 
Political elite 1988 1993 2001 2009 
Non-manual 33.4 58 61.1 62.6 
Manual 66.6 42 38.9 37.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Economic elite 1988 1993 2001 2009 
Non-manual 29.3 43.8 61.8 62.7 
Manual 70.7 56.2 38.2 37.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Cultural elite 1988 1993 2001 2009 
Non-manual 46.6 65.4 71.7 71.8 
Manual 53.4 34.5 28.3 28.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
The most frequent measure for the continuity between communist and post-
communist elites is former Communist Party (MSZMP) membership. Table 7 
shows the declining share of MSZMP-members in the Hungarian elite. In 1988, 
more than 80 per cent of the political and the economic elite were members of 
the party; while this proportion in the cultural elite was slightly lower (71.2 per 
cent). The greatest fall – signifying the greatest elite circulation – affected the 
political elite: the share of (former) members of the CP dropped by more than 
50 per cent by 1993. The decrease was more moderate in the other two elite 
segments (around 17 per cent). However, since the early 1990s, the share of 
former CP members in the political elite has not changed. In 2009, still one 
third of them had been a member of the MSZMP. In the case of the economic 
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elite, the decrease in former CP membership is in line with the gradual genera-
tional change noticeable in Table 4. The share of former CP members fell from 
exactly two thirds in 1993 to 27.3 per cent in 2001, and further decreased to 
19.6 per cent by 2009. In the cultural elite, the presence of the great generation 
was still palpable in the second decade of the period, when the proportion of 
former CP members was still around 30 per cent. 
Table 7: Former Member of the CP (per cent) 
 1988 1993 2001 2009 
Political elite 86.2 34.7 33.8 31.8 
Economic elite 84.2 66.6 27.3 19.6 
Cultural elite 71.2 54.4 34.7 30.4 
 
Another possible measure for continuity is the share of elite members who had 
been in managing positions in 1988. A managing position (according to ISCO-
classification) does not necessarily mean an elite position. For example, a head 
of department at a firm or a university, though not a top leader, was also classi-
fied as manager. These kinds of positions constitute a sub-elite status in one’s 
career path. Using this measure (Table 9), trends are more or less the same as 
in the case of former CP membership. 41.9 per cent of the political elite in1993 
had been in managing positions already in 1988. In line with the share of for-
mer CP membership, this proportion did not change much subsequently. In 
2009, 41.6 per cent of the political elite still consisted of late communist man-
agers. 76.8 per cent of the 1993 economic elite had held managing positions in 
the late communist period. After the early nineties, this proportion decreased to 
two thirds in 2001 and less than half in 2009. In the cultural elite, one third of 
the 1993 elite had been managers already in 1988. During the last two decades, 
this proportion slightly decreased further.  
Comparing the three elite segments, it is striking that while the rate of for-
mer CP members (Table 7) was lowest (19.6 per cent), while the share of for-
mer managers (Table 8) was highest (45 per cent) in the economic elite of 
2009. This difference shows the less political and more professional nature of 
the economic elite’s career paths. 
Table 8: Managers in 1988 (per cent) 
 1988 1993 2001 2009 
Political elite 63.9 41.9 44.3  41.6 
Economic elite         95 76.8 63.7           45 
Cultural elite 53.3 33.6 25.4  28.4 
 
The survey of 1993 allows us also to look at the survival of the elite of 1988 as 
later managers. (The reason is that this survey interviewed members of the 
1988 elite in 1993. Unfortunately, we cannot follow them beyond 1993.). The 
results presented in Table 9 overlap with the earlier findings of elite circulation 
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studies (Szelényi et al. 1995). In the economic and cultural elites, the same 
percentage of the elite members of 1988 were still in managing positions in 
1993 as that of the new elite of 1993. Between 1988 and 1993, a significant 
change occurred only in the political elite. Regarding the political elite, Table 9 
also corroborates the thesis of replacement circulation (Wasilewski 1998, Hig-
ley and Lengyel 2000): almost two thirds of the late socialist political elite, 
though exiled from top political positions, stayed in managerial positions by 
1993.  
Table 9: Managers in 1993  
 Elite of 1988 Elite of 1993 
Political elite                   62 85,4 
Economic elite 95,7 94,9 
Cultural elite 37,8 39,4 
 
What is the significance of continuity of the late communist elite in 2012, 
twenty years after the system change? After twenty years of post-communism, 
approximately every third member of the Hungarian political and cultural elite, 
and every fifth member of the economic elite was a former member of the CP, 
and even more of them had been in controlling positions in the late Kádár-era. 
In the absence of comparative data from other post-communist societies, it is 
hard to judge whether this share is high or low, yet it surely seems to be a stabi-
lizing factor in the political elite (and partly in the cultural elite, too). 
Consequences are mainly political. The rhetoric of the currently governing 
right-wing Fidesz party is about closing the era of post-communism with a kind 
of new ‘revolution’. Anti-establishment parties and movements are also eager 
to mention continuity, especially radical rightists of the Jobbik party. 
Let us take a look at the party sympathies of the Hungarian elite in 2009. 
Table 10 contains only the two biggest political parties: Socialist Party (MSZP) 
and the main right-wing party (Fidesz) because support for the new anti-
establishment (radical right and green) parties was not yet measureable in the 
elite. In 2009, 23.4 per cent of the political elite would have voted for the So-
cialist Party. This rate was significantly higher (43.5 per cent) among former 
CP members. Among the supporters of the largest right-wing party, Fidesz, 
correlation was the inverse: while 27.4 of the elite would have voted for that 
party, this proportion among former CP members was as low as 13.4 per cent. 
In the other two elite segments, the Socialist Party was less popular (especially 
in the economic elite) but the correlations had the same direction: former mem-
bers of the CP were still significantly overrepresented among socialist voters. 
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Table 10: Party Sympathy and Former CP Membership in 2009 
Political elite Former Member of the CP  
Party sympathy in 2009 No Yes Total 
Socialist party (MSZP) 13.8 43.8 23.4 
Right-wing party (Fidesz) 33.9 13.4 27.4 
 
Economic elite Former Member of the CP  
Party sympathy in 2009 No Yes Total 
Socialist party (MSZP) 8 23.2 10.9 
Right-wing party (Fidesz) 28.3   9.8 24.7 
 
Cultural elite Former Member of the CP  
Party sympathy in 2009 No Yes Total 
Socialist party (MSZP) 9 37.9 17.8 
Right-wing party (Fidesz) 32.3 13.8 26.7 
 
Examining the correspondence between party sympathy, former CP member-
ship and former managing position in the late communist era, regression analy-
sis (controlling for socio-demographic variables) showed that CP membership 
is a better measurement of continuity at the level of political sympathies. A 
former managing position did not affect democratic party sympathy in the elite. 
However, in two elite segments it correlated with a broader and more lasting 
measure of political attitudes: self-classification on the left-right scale. Holders 
of former managing positions – and of course former CP members – were 
significantly more leftist in the political and economic elite in 2009. In the 
cultural elite, only former CP membership affected self-positioning along the 
left-right scale. 
Discussion 
Summarising the observed changes in the Hungarian elite from 1988 to 2009, 
three types of processes could be identified.  
1) Long term social continuity. In some aspects, Hungarian elites in the last 
two decades have kept the characteristics of the late communist elite.  
2) Social discontinuity related to elite circulation. Some aspects of the elite 
seriously changed at the time of democratic transformation, due to elite cir-
culation. Based on the analysis of data from the second decade of the stud-
ied period, two subtypes can be distinguished within this type of process: 
- 2.a. Some characteristics of the elite that changed largely due to elite cir-
culation during the system change continued to change in a trend-like fa-
shion in the second half of the period. 
- 2.b. Some characteristics of the elite that changed largely due to elite cir-
culation during the system change did not change (significantly) after the 
transition period.  
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3) Long term social changes not related to elite circulation. Some characteris-
tics of the elite were not really affected by the system change and have var-
ied usually due to generational changes. 
Generally speaking, the political elite was characterised by the 1st and 2nd ‘b’ 
types of processes. The third type was more typical of the economic elite, while 
the cultural elite was somewhere in between, characterised in some aspects by 
2nd ‘b’ trends but more often by the third type, similarly to the economic elite.  
Political Elite 
The share of women and graduates in the Hungarian political elite belong in the 
category of social characteristics that show long term continuity in the studied 
period. The extremely high proportion of graduates seems to be a comparative 
specificity of Hungarian politics. Though the chances of women to get into the 
elite slightly increased during the last decade, there is still a serious representa-
tional deficit of women in politics compared to West-European averages (see 
Ilonszki 2004).  
The continuing presence of the ‘great generation’ of the 1960s is also a con-
spicuous characteristic of the Hungarian political elite. The relatively low mean 
age of the late communist elite questions the stereotype of the gerontocratic 
communist nomenclature. Though holders of top political positions were 
mainly seniors, members of the broader elite were definitely middle-aged, in 
their forties, not older than their counterparts after the democratic transforma-
tion. Circulation in the political elite did not mean a real generational change, 
rather the coming into power of other groups of the same – great – generation. 
The cementing of this generation caused a perceptible ageing in the Hungarian 
political elite in the second decade of the post-communist period. 
The three most important discontinuous characteristics of the political elite 
were former CP membership, former managing position in late communism 
and social origin. The first two attributes are obviously linked to personal cir-
culation of the old nomenclature elite. The extreme decrease of these specifici-
ties was the direct consequence of democratic transformation. Changes in so-
cial origin – namely, the decreasing share of non-manual workers among the 
fathers of elite members – indicated the different social background of new 
elite groups after the democratic transformation. The shift in social composi-
tion is at least partially due to the inclusion of earlier excluded social groups 
into the new political elite. However, the truly interesting nature of these three 
discontinuous attributes of the political elite is that they all belong to the 2.b. 
subtype of their category: after the dramatic change of the transition period 
they have not changed further at all. In 2009, still every third member of the 
political elite was a former CP member, exactly as in 1993. In terms of per-
sonal continuity, we can speak of the survival of system transformers, coming 
from both late communist and new democratic elite groups, who shaped Hun-
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garian political life throughout the post-communist decades to a very great 
extent.  
Economic and Cultural Elites 
The economic and cultural elites of the late communist era were the most edu-
cated and most male-dominated groups among all the elite samples studied. 
They were virtually composed only of male graduates. Researchers of the tran-
sition period argued that the selection criteria of the Hungarian economic and 
cultural elites in the 1980s were rather meritocratic (with the exception of peo-
ple openly criticising the communist system). However, the very low share of 
women in these elite segments questions the common belief that the period of 
communist modernization provided women with equal chances in career build-
ing. The changes in the proportion of women in the economic and cultural 
elites are clear examples for long term social changes not particularly related to 
the system change. The share of female elite members started to increase only 
in the second post-communist decade. Although still very low, it more than 
doubled from its starting level and seems to converge to West-European rates. 
As for education, the economic elite shows a similarly gradual, long term 
change: the share of graduates is returning to a more ‘normal’ level. In the 
cultural elite, the proportion of graduates is continuous and a university or 
college degree seems to be permanent standard. 
While the economic and cultural elites have become more open to women 
during the last two decades, in terms of social origin they have become more 
closed. Similarly to the political elite, the share of elite members whose fathers 
had a non-manual job increased in the studied period. In this sense, there is a 
clear discontinuity between the communist and post-communist elites in all 
elite segments. In 1988, the share of manual working fathers was above 50 per 
cent in all segments. This proportion fell dramatically after the system change: 
the new members clearly came from families with higher status. As I men-
tioned above, in the case of the political elite this change could be linked to 
political transformation: social groups dispreferred by communist ideology 
streamed into the elite. However, in the case of economic elite, the rate of 
members with a higher status background increased gradually with every new 
generation, and seems to have reached a new equilibrium after the millennium, 
independently of political changes. In this respect, changes in the cultural elite 
resembled the political rather than the economic elite: it became socially more 
closed after the system change but the rate of members with a lower social 
background did not much change afterwards.  
From the aspect of discontinuity, the economic elite is the antithesis of po-
litical elite. Indicating lower circulation, the share of former CP members and 
late communist managers decreased much less between 1988 and 1993 than in 
the political elite. However, in the long run it fell gradually and reached a com-
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paratively low level by 2009. The cultural elite can be placed in between the 
economic and political elites. It was affected less by the system change than the 
political elite, and the share of former CP members and former managers 
gradually decreased in the first decade of post-communism, yet later halted at a 
level higher than in the economic elite. This difference may be caused by the 
permanent presence of a distinguished ‘great generation’ detected not only in 
political, but also in cultural elite. 
Conclusion 
What can explain the variance of processes of change across different segments 
of the Hungarian elite? One explanatory factor is the law of elite circulation 
itself. Regarding continuity between communist and post-communist elites, 
Ilonszki stresses that different elite segments of a non-democratic system show 
varying degrees of ability to survive, and members of the political elite have 
particularly weak chances to survive (Ilonszki 2003). This explains the greater 
discontinuity of the political elite. However, it does not explain why changes in 
the political elite halted afterwards. It seems that, after the great trauma of 
democratic transformation, further changes in the political elite did not keep up 
with changes in the other two segments. The social attributes of the Hungarian 
political elite barely changed between 1993 and 2009. Even normal genera-
tional changes seem to have been blocked. At the same time, the economic and 
cultural elites, originally affected less by the system change, grew gradually 
less and less post-communist, and converged to the elites of stable democracies 
(at least in their basic social character).  
Nowadays, debates on the communist legacy are more salient in the public 
life of Hungary than ten years ago. Due to widely perceived democratic deficit 
(see Lengyel and Ilonszki 2010), the performance of the political elite is being 
questioned once again. However, long term empirical data suggest that, twenty 
years after the transformation, the ‘survival of transformers’, i.e. the continuity 
of the post-communist elite may be a factor at least as relevant as the survival 
of parts of the communist elite. 
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